Lecciones de la crisis japonesa

"Algunas lecciones de la crisis japonesa", articulo publicado el 03-11-2008 , por José Carlos Díez. Economista jefe de InterMoney, en Expansion.com:

En 1991, la bolsa japonesa y los precios inmobiliarios se desplomaron y provocaron la peor crisis de un país desarrollado desde la Gran Depresión. El sistema bancario había financiado toda aquella locura y el desplome del valor de los colaterales provocó una quiebra sistémica, cuyo saneamiento ha costado el 15% del PIB japonés.


La principal característica de la crisis fue la inacción, tanto de los responsables de la política económica como de las empresas y de los bancos.

Cuando comenzaron a tomar medidas, el sistema financiero estaba quebrado, la economía entró en una trampa de la liquidez keynesiana, la política monetaria perdió efectividad y el policy mix de política económica fue desastroso, especialmente la política cambiaria y fiscal que acabaron neutralizando sus efectos restando efectividad a las medidas. A continuación, se va analizar las consecuencias de la crisis, que más de tres lustros después mantienen a la economía nipona al borde de la deflación.

La deflación maligna

La deflación es una patología atípica y es lógico que los economistas nos preocupemos más de proteger a las economías de la inflación que es más habitual. Pero, Japón es un ejemplo de la deflación y sus efectos deben hacer que cualquier sociedad tome las medidas que sean necesarias para protegerse de ella.

Se puede observar la debilidad del crecimiento de del PIB que ha registrado un crecimiento promedio anual de 1,3% desde 2001 hasta 2007. Destaca la debilidad del consumo privado y la inversión y la fortaleza de las exportaciones.

Cuando las familias tienen expectativas deflacionistas retrasan sus decisiones de consumo, especialmente de bienes duraderos, ya que esperan que al año siguiente podrán comprar los bienes más baratos.

La debilidad de consumo estanca las ventas de las empresas y la deflación de precios, junto a salarios nominales rígidos a la baja, hunde los márgenes empresariales, lo cual elimina cualquier incentivo a invertir en nuevos proyectos empresariales e incluso en proteger a la capacidad instalada de su depreciación.

Esto explica que la tesis de Keynes en la teoría General fuera que ante la contracción de la demanda efectiva, tenía que ser el gasto público el que compensase los efectos de deflación para evitar en una caída en picado de la acumulación de capital que hundiese el crecimiento potencial.


Por fortuna para Japón, la burbuja se concentró en el precio de los activos inmobiliarios y de las acciones pero no se contagió al resto del mundo, por lo que gracias a su elevada capacidad tecnológica la economía puede mantener el crecimiento y la acumulación de capital vía exportaciones. Eso libró a Japón de la pobreza extrema que si se produjo en la Gran Depresión.

En el gráfico 2 se puede observar cómo el sector público tardó varios años en implementar políticas fiscales expansivas y cuando lo hizo fue ineficaz, al no priorizar el gasto en infraestructuras y acompañarlo de medidas de liberalización de sus economías para aumentar el crecimiento potencial.

Conclusiones

Aunque en la actual crisis también hay deflación de activos, por fortuna hay muchas diferencias que alejan el caso japonés del escenario central, aunque el riesgo sigue existiendo. La principal es que al ser una crisis de activos, el desplome de los mercados, especialmente de las bolsas, ha hecho que la sociedad sea consciente de la gravedad de la crisis y ha favorecida la acción de los Gobiernos.

Las primeras medidas han sido apuntalar el sistema financiero y recapitalizar a los bancos más afectados, pero ahora ha llegado la hora de la política fiscal. En las últimas décadas el paradigma liberal del minimalismo público «menos estado es más» ha primado la rebaja de impuestos. A partir de ahora, la incertidumbre es máxima y la bajada de impuestos puede ser destinada por las familias al ahorro, por lo que replicaríamos la trampa de la liquidez keynesiana que ha asolado Japón.

El gasto público tiene un efecto multiplicador y acaba arras-trando al sector privado al reactivar el empleo y las rentas salariales. Lo relevante es tener presente que el Estado no puede suplantar al sector privado permanentemente y que debe priorizar el gasto en infraestructuras. El anuncio de fuertes emisiones de deuda pública mundial ha provocado un aumento de las pendientes de las curvas de tipos, lo cual nos aleja del caso japonés. Sin duda, una gran noticia.

Investment banking: Difficult times may give rise to a different model

Very interesting article publshed in Financial Times (www.ft.com), writed by Brooke Masters and entitled "Investment banking: Difficult times may give rise to a different model":

"Of all the financial services sectors, investment banking has been hit the hardest by the turmoil of the past year or so.

Not only have such venerable houses such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers disappeared, but the survivors have had to find well-capitalised partners or reconstitute themselves as traditional commercial banks.

Volatile equity markets, the credit squeeze and the sharp decline in activity on Aim have made it hard for corporates of all sizes to raise money and have hit the bottom lines at bulge-bracket investment banks and smaller boutiques alike.

Many institutional investors are sitting on the sidelines and most banks are reluctant to lend.

Yet companies still need to raise money: to keep going, refinance debt, or take opportunities. That makes them even more dependent on their advisers to help them find a way through what everyone agrees are difficult times.

“In these volatile times, it is crucial to be close to the markets, so we can advise clients on how shareholders will react to corporate developments. When it comes to capital-raising, our ability to judge the market and move quickly are important,” says Naguib Kheraj, chief executive of JPMorgan Cazenove.

Very few deals are likely to get done before Christmas and some bankers think the slowdown could continue through the first few months of next year.
Investors and lenders, they say, are waiting to see first quarter 2009 results to get a sense of where earnings will go.

As a result, many corporate advisers are using this period to help clients get ready for tough scrutiny.

“Cash is still king, so advisers will be spending a lot of time over the several months helping their clients take a hard look at their balance sheets to determine the most advantageous mix of assets.

“Those who have managed their resources well will have a big advantage,” says Marisa Drew, a Credit Suisse managing director who is co-head of the European global markets solutions group and the European leveraged finance origination group.
The next year may see the return of private equity-backed deals, albeit on a far smaller scale than in pre-crunch days.

“Private equity deal volumes have fallen away, but dialogue and the search for opportunities has not,” says Simon Tilley, head of the European Financial Sponsors Group at Close Brothers. “Identifying and delivering bolt-on acquisition opportunities is a key focus for private equity sponsors and for our business.”

Some bankers believe the financial crisis will prove to be a great opportunity for the big universal banks, such as Citigroup and JP Morgan, which can talk up relationship banking, their top-tier mergers, and how they can offer acquisition advice, financing, foreign exchange and cash management all at once.

“Historically, we have supported our clients through difficult times and we expect this downturn to be no different,” says Tom King, head of Europe, Middle East and Africa Banking at Citigroup.

Companies interested in tapping the big banks for financing may find they have to offer other businesses as a sweetener. Lenders have become highly selective about which deals they will back, and institutional investors are also having to husband their cash.

“Companies need to foster and guard relationships with these organisations, as it is longer-term knowledge, shared experiences and the resultant loyalty that will have a bearing on the provision of services and financial backing – be that equity provision from fund managers, debt funding from banks or advice from investment banks,” says David Currie, head of UK investment banking at Investec.

On the other hand, difficult markets may also prove to be an opportunity for a completely different model because some companies will want independent advice that does not come with strings attached.

They are likely to turn to a wide variety of service providers, ranging from Rothschild and Lazard via boutiques such as Greenhill Partners and Fenchurch, to the corporate finance arms of the big accounting and consulting firms.

“Independence from a trading arm and balance sheet for funding will be an advantage both in terms of escaping the fallout and also reputation and reliability – and this is something that corporate finance boutiques and professional services firms alike will be able to leverage and benefit from,” says Neil Sutton, Head of UK Corporate Finance, PwC.

“We may therefore see a re-ordering of adviser brands, where independence and agility in the face of turbulence win over more traditional investment banking names or newly established boutiques.”

After the 2001 dotcom crash, some financial services industry observers predicted the emergence of a “barbell effect” in which universal banks and independent boutiques would prosper, while those in the middle were pushed out.

Independents certainly grew. According to Thomson Financial, in 2000, independent advisers advised on 19 per cent of global M&A. In 2007, the figure was 38 per cent.
But the banks in the middle prospered as well, because the whole pot got bigger and all sizes and kinds of investment banks did well. This downturn may bring about that long-expected squeeze. It may already be under way.

The last big US independent investment banks – Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs – are rushing to add a retail component, and retail banks such as Barclays – which picked up large parts of Lehman’s US business – and Bank of America – which is merging with Merrill Lynch – are expanding their advisory side.

It will be up to their clients to make clear which model they prefer.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

Migrant Money Remittances help to boost Real Estate in Emerging Markets

According to www.iamtn.org, migration patterns have been shifting and along with them, the financial impact of remittances is leaving its trail. This money trail now follows the migrants moving from one developing country to another. One of the largest impacts of this migration pattern is on real estate. A recent report 'Global Demographics 2008' by Urban Land Institute, partly sponsored by Deloitte LLP, suggests that "global remittances from immigrants to their families support residential and retail developments in their countries of origin". Firstly, one of the first priorities for a remittance recipient is to spend on housing, leading to growth in real estate markets in 'receive' countries. A blue-collar worker from rural southern India sends money from the Middle East to his wife, two children and widowed mother; his wife says, "We have been saving the amount he sends us to build a home on the outskirts of a nearby urban area."

Second, the growing number of white-collar expatriates demands high quality residential realty in 'send' markets. Even at the lower level, migrant influx translates to housing and retail space demand. Global Demographics 2008 suggests that "increasingly, migrants gravitate towards large, urban areas". Already, the price of real estate in growing urban pockets of several developing nations is starting to climb. The report claims that "new migration patterns" are amongst the key factors that shape the future of real estate internationally.

Says Lady Olga Maitland, CEO, IAMTN, "We are well aware of the impact on real estate, and this is set to grow. In some countries it plays a more significant role than others. In Nigeria, 40% of the remittances go to building a home. Broadly remittances are prioritized into first sustenance; food then health, education, house building and finally a family business."

Less regulation in the case of SEC?

U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission member Paul Atkins recently co-wrote an article claiming that enforcement issues are so egregious that the SEC needs to set up an independent review panel. The last time the SEC had one was 36 years ago.

These are excerps from the article:

Financial markets and their regulatory landscape have changed markedly in the past three and a half decades since an independent panel reviewed the SEC's enforcement program. It is time to convene a similar panel to bring the program up to date. The Division of Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission has a proud history and many dedicated attorneys, accountants and other staff. Thirty-six years after its creation, the Enforcement Division is larger, stronger and more visible than anyone at the time could have imagined.

In the 36 years since the Wells Committee set out its recommendations, financial markets have changed tremendously, and corporate scandals have rocked both Wall Street and Main Street. In response, Congress gave the SEC significantly more enforcement authority, much of it penal in nature. The SEC now can impose multimillion-dollar penalties against corporations and individuals, bar individuals from serving as officers and directors of corporations, and prevent professionals such as accountants and securities lawyers from practicing before the SEC. Some believe that in exercising these new punitive powers, the SEC has shifted its focus without adjusting its due process protections along the way. It is time for the commission to convene a new advisory committee, in a spirit similar to that of the Wells Committee, to conduct an independent review of the SEC's enforcement program and to recommend any needed changes to modernize enforcement practices. As the Wells Committee did, this new committee also should examine whether the SEC is taking appropriate steps to protect the rights of defendants and to provide appropriate due process. Although much has changed since the original Wells Committee did its work, the same philosophical and practical concerns exist today. Therefore, the new advisory committee could adopt essentially the same mandate as that of the Wells Committee in 1972.

Among the many issues that would fall under this broad mandate would be the implementation of mechanisms to provide more efficacy, predictability and transparency to the enforcement program. As an agency tasked with enforcing laws and regulations mandating transparency, the SEC itself must provide transparency to the public in its enforcement practices. Predictability and transparency provide for a fair process that respects the rights of all parties involved and ensures adherence to the rule of law.

The SEC is governed by a five-member commission, each of whom is appointed by the president with Senate confirmation. The commission delegates to the career staff investigative authority, but the commission retains the decision by majority vote to issue subpoenas and to sue defendants or settle with them. The most important Wells Committee recommendation was that the enforcement staff should give notice to a prospective defendant of the potential charges to be asserted against him before the enforcement division seeks authority from the commission to sue. This policy change was a key protection of due process, and gave a defendant the ability to defend himself on the basis of facts and the law. Thus, the formal defense submission in response to the notice came to be known as a "Wells Submission." Often, the facts uncovered in investigations indicate that no action should be taken against a potential defendant, or a Wells Submission may be persuasive in arguing against an action. Sometimes, however, institutional and other factors may make it difficult to drop a matter altogether. The ability of the Enforcement Division to recommend that no action be taken in a particular matter based on the facts and law should be encouraged and institutionalized. This will require a re-evaluation of the incentives for bringing actions and obtaining penalties, such as through promotions, awards and public recognition of SEC staff. An evaluation system should focus on rewarding high-quality efforts and professionalism regardless of the outcome of particular actions. In some instances, exercising discretion may not be appropriate. There should not be institutional encouragement for using discretion to formulate theories of liability that overstep the boundaries of existing law.
Standards are set through the legislative process in Congress and through the SEC's rule-making process; it is not the function of the Enforcement Division. Rule making through enforcement violates the fundamental principles of due process that Congress established in the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires regulatory agencies to give notice and seek (and respond to) comment from the public before adopting or changing rules. In the recent past, federal courts have nullified various SEC rule-making attempts because the agency did not follow proper procedure or overstepped its authority in adopting rules.

The U.S. General Accountability Office in 2007 strongly criticized the Enforcement Division for not promptly closing investigations at their conclusion. When the commission or its staff determines that an investigation should be closed or action is not warranted, the agency should promptly send a closing letter, not only to those who have made a Wells Submission but also to any significant nonparty who has been involved in the investigation. The advisory committee also should consider bolstering the Wells Submission process by permitting a proposed defendant to appear before the commission to oppose the initiation of an enforcement proceeding. Although it would be both unnecessary and unmanageable to allow such an "oral Wells Submission" in every matter, it may be beneficial to both the commission and proposed defendants for the commission to have a discretionary avenue to hear from proposed defendants prior to taking action, particularly in complex cases or those in which character assessment is important. A review of the enforcement process would not be complete without a review of the costs to parties responding to an investigation. The SEC must ensure that its investigations and enforcement actions do not impose unnecessary costs. Overly broad subpoenas or document or interview requests add to a responding entity's costs--and not every responding entity becomes a defendant. Compliance with notices to preserve--and subsequent requests to produce--electronic data, including e-mails, voice mails and server backup tapes, is undeniably burdensome and can be very expensive.

It is critical for the SEC to have certain electronic data, but preservation notices and requests for their production are often generic and extend well beyond the boundaries of an existing investigation. The new advisory committee should recommend ways to minimize costs while still ensuring that the SEC can get the information it needs for its investigations. With respect to enforcement policies, the advisory committee should examine the usage, effects, amount and appropriateness of corporate penalties in financial fraud cases, to determine if they are consistent with the SEC's mission to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly and efficient capital markets; and facilitate capital formation.

When evaluating the use of penalties against issuers of securities in financial fraud cases, the advisory committee should, for example, ask, Do penalties protect investors? Do they harm or benefit shareholders? Is the circularity of "Fair Fund" penalty distributions (the company pays--meaning, in effect, the shareholders pay--a penalty, which is put into a fund and then distributed to the company's shareholders) consistent with ensuring fair, orderly and efficient capital markets? Is capital formation impeded by the threat of large, unpredictable issuer penalties? Do we create a moral hazard if we permit officers of companies to agree to a large corporate penalty to avoid or soften actions against culpable individuals? Are individuals deterred from wrongdoing if they expect that shareholders will pay the penalties for the misconduct? And, most important, does the prospect of large issuer penalties and the inevitable press coverage cause the SEC to misallocate resources to use the government's power to pursue weaker cases to the detriment of other types of enforcement actions?.

But thigs may are not giving the reason to Mr. Atkins. The SEC is getting into the act as well with its “emergency order” restricting short trading — not in general, but specifically in the shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both of whom are protectorates of the federal government anyway. The SEC’s supposed target is “unlawful manipulation,” which is illegal.

All this in a not very serious maner. Normally in a functioning democracy, lawmakers and federal agencies craft rules through a deliberative process, and those rules apply prospectively across the board. When the government acts through orders rather than legislation or established administrative procedurees to identify emergencies and bogey men, and then seeks to outlaw their practices with hastily drafted decrees — well, that’s when the market makers, who depend on freedom and the established rule of law, should start to worry.

Paul S. Atkins is a commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Bradley J. Bondi is legal counsel and policy adviser to Commissioner Atkins. Their article is extracted from “Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review Of The History And Evolution Of The SEC Enforcement Program,” first published in the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law.

Lack of preparedness for the European Payment Services Directive

A recent IAMTN survey of money service businesses shows a serious lack of preparedness for the implementation of the European Payment Services Directive which comes into force in November 2009 - just 16 months away. Despite the fact that the Payment Services Directive which will impact on all those financial services providing money transfer facilities, IAMTN survey shows that companies have not got to grips with the changes which will impact on their business. The IAMTN response is similar to a survey put out by PSE Consulting exclusively to banks.

Addressing a conference organized by Sidley Austin on the European Payments Services Directive, Lady Olga Maitland, CEO, IAMTN said "Our findings are worrying for the money service sector. Most companies we found have chosen to ignore the changes or make any preparation at all - despite being only 16 months away from the deadline. Bearing in mind that the PSD will have a beneficial effect on the money service sector; giving them a level playing field with banks in Europe - and a great opportunity for both themselves and their customers, it is interesting to note how little attention has been paid to changes which will undoubtedly change the way they operate. "Indeed we found, as indeed did PSE in their survey, that the vast majority of businesses and banks are light years away from preparedness. This will cause massive last minute problems for them."

The Payment Services Directive was approved by the European Parliament in December 2007. Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, described its objectives as 'generating more competition' providing a simple, harmonized set of rule and ensuring a high level of consumer protection." The PSD will have a revolutionary effect on the legal framework between banks and their customers setting stringent rules for information disclosure, conduct of business rules and service provision. It addition it introduces a new lightly regulated licensed entity called a 'Payments Institution' which may allow non-banks ie. Money service businesses etc to join the bankers' payment schemes and associations across the European Union. It could be said that the money service sector and banks are into new territory. They are unused to implementing prescriptive legislation from the EU. As a consequence smaller institutions appear to be unaware of the potential impact of the PSD on their customers and operations.

While the major international institutions expect to be ready by November 1st, 2009, substantial concerns have appeared for the lack of readiness by smaller banks - let alone the money service businesses. "What was interesting in our survey were those who did NOT respond when it was in their interests for their businesses to take advantage of the new opportunities. Lack of awareness of the changes ahead, like it or not, have not hit them. Among those who did respond, they had a moderate understanding of the changes. Most felt that the impact would be modest. Interestingly it was the small and medium sized businesses who felt that the PSD would be implemented on time. The major institutions did not."

The Majority of respondents to our questionnaire who are more aware than most, admitted they have not yet made any effort to prepare for the changes. Others are keeping their heads down and waiting for the implementation by national governments. Only 11% had made an impact assessment and of that only 7% had agreed a budget for implementation. The others had not got started. As a result they had not consulted with third party providers who would also be involved, ie. The software companies, agency banks, agents and so on. For those who had given some thought, they felt that the greatest effort will fall on adjusting the IT, and updating the terms and conditions. Interestingly we should recall the Capgemini World Payments Report 2007 who also lamented lack of preparedness. But in addition they pointed out that the greatest beneficiaries would be the card sector. They anticipated that by 2012 44% of all non-cash transactions in Europe will be via cards - to the point that Europe needs a 'any card at any terminal solution. Costs. Most believe it will not be that bad.

Banks though are fearful. According to PSE Consulting over 40% of banks surveyed believe that implementation will cost them more than 10m Euros and almost 25% believe it will cost over 50mEuros. Significantly nearly 60% of the banks surveyed do not believe there will be any benefits. Broadly though there is a positive feel about the opportunities. Indeed 61% in the IAMTN survey said there would be a revenue benefit. If there is a wind of change, it will affect the banks the most, who face highly competitive, agile and innovative money service business competition."